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Abstract
Although adversarial samples of deep neural net-
works (DNNs) have been intensively studied on
static images, their extensions in videos are never
explored. Compared with images, attacking a video
needs to consider not only spatial cues but also
temporal cues. Moreover, to improve the im-
perceptibility as well as reduce the computation
cost, perturbations should be added on as fewer
frames as possible, i.e., adversarial perturbations
are temporally sparse. This further motivates the
propagation of perturbations, which denotes that
perturbations added on the current frame can trans-
fer to the next frames via their temporal interac-
tions. Thus, no (or few) extra perturbations are
needed for these frames to misclassify them. To
this end, we propose an l2,1-norm based optimiza-
tion algorithm to compute the sparse adversarial
perturbations for videos. We choose the action
recognition as the targeted task, and networks with
a CNN+RNN architecture as threat models to ver-
ify our method. Thanks to the propagation, we
can compute perturbations on a shortened version
video, and then adapt them to the long version
video to fool DNNs. Experimental results on the
UCF101 dataset demonstrate that even only one
frame in a video is perturbed, the fooling rate can
still reach 59.7%.
1 Introduction
In the past decade, Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have
shown great superiority in computer vision tasks, like im-
age recognition [He et al., 2016], image restoration [Dong
et al., 2014] and visual tracking [Wang and Yeung, 2013].
Although DNNs obtain the state-of-the-art performance in
these tasks, they are known to be vulnerable to adversar-
ial samples [Szegedy et al., 2013], i.e., the images with vi-
sually imperceptible perturbations that can mislead the net-
work to produce wrong predictions. The adversarial sam-
ples are usually calculated by the Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [Goodfellow et al., 2014] and optimization-based
methods [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016a]. One reason for
adversarial samples is considered to be that they are fell
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Figure 1: An illustration of our output for a video from UCF101
dataset with label of BabyCrawling. The computed perturbations
successfully fool DNNs to output label of PlayingBasketball. The
Mean Absolute Perturbation (MAP) of each frame is plotted. From
the figure, we see that MAP values are significantly reduced along
with the varying frames. In the final 20 frames, they fall into almost
zero, showing the sparsity of perturbations. Note that, though these
frames have no perturbations, they still make DNNs predict wrong
label for each frame (see the top arrow line). That’s to say, the pertur-
bations from previous frames propagate here and show their power.
Four triples indicate the results from the 1-, 5-, 13-, 27-th frames, re-
spectively. In each triple, we see the adversarial frame is the same
to the original frame in the appearance. We better visualize the per-
turbations with increasing their amplitudes with × 255.
on some areas in the high-dimensional feature space which
are not explored during training. Thus, investigating ad-
versarial samples not only helps understand the working
mechanism of deep networks, but also provides opportuni-
ties to improve the networks’ robustness [Xie et al., 2017;
Dong et al., 2017].
Up to now, many studies about adversarial samples have
been investigated, such as adversarial perturbations for a sin-
gle image [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016b], universal adver-
sarial perturbations [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016a] and ad-
versarial samples for object detection and segmentation [Xie
et al., 2017]. However, these studies are all based on images,
while leaving videos unexplored. Investigating adversarial
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Figure 2: The illustration of our method. An l2,1 norm is used during
the optimization, which enforces the sparsity of computed perturba-
tions. Within the CNN+RNN architecture (action recognition net-
work), perturbations are encoded after the CNN, and then propagate
to the next frames via RNN, finally resulting in the misclassified la-
bel for the whole video. Thanks to the propagation of perturbations,
perturbations added on the final frames fall into zeros.
samples on videos is of both theoretical and practical values,
as deep neural networks have been widely applied in video
analysis tasks [Donahue et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2015;
Wang et al., 2016].
Technnically, the main difference between videos and im-
ages lies in the temporal structure contained in videos. There-
fore, a properly designed attacking method should explore
the temporal information to achieve efficiency and effec-
tiveness. We expect that the perturbations added on one
frame can propagate to other frames via temporal interac-
tions, which will be called the propagation of perturba-
tions. Besides, a video have many frames, computing per-
turbations for each frame is time-consuming, and actually
not necessary. Whether it is possible that perturbations are
added on only few frames, and then are propagated to other
frames to misclassify the whole video. In this way, the gener-
ated adversarial videos also have high imperceptibility and
are hard to be detected. Because perturbations are added
on sparse frames rather than the whole video, we call it the
sparsity of perturbations. Actually, the propagation and
sparsity interact with each other, propagation helps boost
the sparsity, meanwhile the sparsity constraint will lead to
better propagation.
For these reasons, in this paper, we aim to attack the video
action recognition task [Poppe, 2010], where the temporal
cue is a key component for the predicted label. This is nat-
urally suitable to explore the temporal adversarial perturba-
tions. For the threat model, we choose the networks with
a CNN+RNN architecture, which is widely used in action
recognition, such as Long-term Recurrent Convolutional Net-
work (LRCN) [Donahue et al., 2017] or network in [Yue-
Hei Ng et al., 2015]. To achieve sparsity. we apply an l2,1-
norm regularization on perturbations during the optimization.
The l2,1-norm uses the l1 norm across frames, and thus, en-
forces to select few key frames to add perturbations. As for
propagation, we find perturbations show good propagation
under the l2,1 constraint within the recurrent neural network
(such as Vanilla RNN, LSTM and GRU) because of the in-
teraction with sparsity. Another advantage of the propaga-
tion is that we can compute perturbations on a shortened ver-
sion video, and then adapt them to the long version video to
fool DNNs, which provides a more efficient method to attack
videos. The illustrations of our output and method are given
in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, respectively.
In summary, this paper has the following contributions:
• To our knowledge, we are the first to explore adversar-
ial samples in videos. Considering the specific sparsity
and propagation of video adversarial perturbations, we
propose an l2,1-norm regularization based optimization
algorithm. We verify our method and evaluate its trans-
ferability on the UCF101 dataset.
• We give a comprehensive evaluation of the sparsity and
propagation of perturbations, and furthermore, propose
the propagation-based method for adversarial videos,
i.e., computing perturbations on a shortened version
video, and then adapt them to the long version video.
We also find that LSTM and GRU are easier to be at-
tacked than Vanilla RNN, because LSTM and GRU can
represent long memory, which is favor to the perturba-
tion propagation (see experiments).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
2, we briefly review the related work. We present our algo-
rithm in Section 3. Section 4 reports all experimental results.
Finally, we summarize the conclusions in Section 5.
2 Related Work
The related work comes from two aspects: action recognition
with deep learning and adversarial attack.
2.1 Action Recognition with Deep Learning
Action recognition is a core task in computer vision, where
its goal is to predict a video-level label when given a video
clip [Poppe, 2010]. With the rise of deep convolutional neu-
ral networks (CNNs) achieving state-of-the-art performance
on image recognition, many works have looked into design-
ing effective deep CNNs for action recognition. For in-
stance, various approaches of fusing CNN features computed
on RGB frames over the temporal dimension are explored on
the Sport1M dataset [Karpathy et al., 2014]. To integrate the
temporal information, CNN+LSTM based models, which use
a CNN to extract frame features and an LSTM to integrate
features over time, are also presented to recognize activities
in videos [Donahue et al., 2017; Nguyen et al., 2015]. Opti-
cal flow is also useful to encode the temporal cue. For this,
two stream CNNs with one stream of static images and the
other stream of optical flows are proposed to fuse the in-
formation of object appearance and short-term motions [Si-
monyan and Zisserman, 2014]. Temporal Segment Networks
sample frames and optical flow on different time segments
to extract information for activity recognition [Wang et al.,
2016]. In our paper, to better explore how the perturbations
change along with the time, we choose the networks with a
CNN+RNN architecture as the threat model.
2.2 Adversarial Attack
Generating adversarial examples for classification has been
extensively studied in many different ways recently. Szegedy
et al. [2013] first show that adversarial examples, computed
by adding visually imperceptible perturbations to the orig-
inal images, make CNNs predict a wrong label with high
confidence. Goodfellow et al. [2014] propose a simple and
fast gradient sign method to generate adversarial examples
based on the linear nature of CNNs. Moosavi-Dezfooli et
al. [2016b] propose a simple algorithm to compute the min-
imal adversarial perturbation by assuming that the loss func-
tion can be linearized around the current data point at each
iteration. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [2016a] show the exis-
tence of universal (image-agnostic) adversarial perturbations.
Baluja and Fischer [2017] train a network to generate adver-
sarial examples for a particular target model (without using
gradients). Kurakin et al. [2016] show that the adversarial
examples for machine learning systems also exist in the phys-
ical world. Liu et al. [2016] study the transferability of both
non-targeted and targeted adversarial examples, and proposed
an ensemble-based approaches to generate adversarial exam-
ples with stronger transferability. The above papers are all
based on images, while we focus on video adversarial sam-
ples, which have new challenges.
3 Methodology
In this section, we introduce the proposed l2,1-norm based
algorithm for video adversarial samples. Our method is an
optimization-based approach.
Let X ∈ RT×W×H×C denote a clean video, and Xˆ de-
note its adversarial video, where T is the number of frames,
W,H,C are the width, height, and channel for a specific
frame, respectively. E = Xˆ − X is the adversarial pertur-
bations. To generate non-targeted adversarial examples, we
approximate the solution to the following objective function:
arg min
E
λ||E||p − `(1y, Jθ(Xˆ)), (1)
where `(, ·, ) is the loss function to measure the difference
between the prediction and the ground truth label. In this
paper, we choose the widely used cross-entropy function
`(u, v) = log(1−u·v), which is shown to be effective [Carlini
and Wagner, 2017]. Jθ(·) is the threat model with parameters
θ. 1y is the one-hot encoding of the ground truth label y.
||E||p is the `p norm of E, which is a metric to quantify the
magnitude of the perturbation. λ is a constant to balance the
two terms in the objective.
To obtain a universal adversarial perturbation across
videos, we solve the following problem:
arg min
E
λ||E||p − 1
N
N∑
i=1
`(1yi , Jθ(Xˆi)), (2)
where N is total number of training videos, and Xˆi is the i-th
adversarial video.
To better control the sparsity and study the perturbation
propagation across frames, we add a temporal mask on the
video to enforce some frames having no perturbations. The
problem is modified as follows:
arg min
E
λ||M ·E||p− 1
N
N∑
i=1
`(1yi , Jθ(Xi +M ·E)), (3)
where M ∈ {0,1}T×W×H×C is the temporal mask. We let
Θ = {1, 2, ..., T} be the set of frame indices, Φ is a subset
within Θ having K elements, and Ψ = Θ−Φ. If t ∈ Φ, we set
Mt = 0, and if t ∈ Ψ,Mt = 1, where Mt ∈ {0,1}W×H×C
is the t-th frame in M. In this way, we enforce the computed
perturbations to be added only on the selected video frames.
We here regard S = KT as the sparsity.
If the goal is to generate targeted adversarial examples (i.e.,
the misclassified label is set to the pre-fixed label, which is
called target label), the problem can be modified as follows:
arg min
E
λ||M ·E||p+ 1
N
N∑
i=1
`(1y∗i , Jθ(Xi+M ·E)), (4)
where y∗i is the targeted label. Eq.(4) outputs the perturba-
tions to make Jθ(·) predict y∗i with a high probability.
Perturbation Regularization
The lp-norm in problem (1,2,3,4) is a metric to quantify the
magnitude of the perturbation. As mentioned before, we hope
that the perturbations are added on as fewer frames as possi-
ble. Therefore, we choose l2,1 norm to meet this goal, where
is widely used in sparse coding methods [Wright et al., 2009;
Yang et al., 2010]. ||E||2,1 =
∑T
t ||Et||2, where Et ∈
RW×H×C is the t-th frame in E. l2,1 norm apply the l1 norm
across the frames, and thus, can ensure the sparsity of gen-
erated perturbations. In the experiment, we also show the
results using l2 norm, as the comparison with the l2,1 norm.
Threat Model
In action recognition, the current state-of-the-art approach is
the two-stream model [Donahue et al., 2017], i.e., one stream
is to capture the RGB frames, and another stream is to capture
the optical flow images (motion information) between two ad-
jacent RGB frames. The outputs from these two streams are
fused to predict the final label with various kinds of fusion
methods. These two streams usually have the same network
architecture, where one choice is CNN+Pooling, and another
is CNN+RNN architecture. Compared with CNN+Pooling,
CNN+RNN can encode the temporal information. In our pa-
per, we regard the networks with CNN+RNN architecture as
the threat model Jθ(·). The results of attacking CNN+Pooling
also are reported for comparisons. We give the illustration of
the CNN+RNN model in Fig. 2. Note that, the CNN and
RNN in the figure are the general terms for the spatial and
temporal networks, respectively. CNN can be specified as
ResNet, Inception V3, etc, and RNN as LSTM, GRU, etc.
Training
Problems (1,2,3,4) are easy to solve. Any Stochastic Gradient
Descent (SGD) algorithm can solve them. Here, we use the
Adam [Kingma and Ba, 2014] algorithm to get the results.
Figure 3: The computed adversarial videos (top two rows) and their corresponding perturbations (bottom row) using Eq.(2) with l2,1 norm.
We better visualize the perturbations with increasing their amplitudes with × 255. For more discussions, please see the texts.
Because l2,1 norm is used, initializing the perturbations with
zeros will lead to NaN values. We instead initialize them us-
ing a small value. In the experiments, we use 0.0001. After
some iterations, the perturbations will converge to a sparse
result. λ in problem (1,2,3,4) is set to a constant, which is
tuned in the training set. Temporal mask M is predefined ac-
cording to the needed sparsity. We investigate some choices,
and give the corresponding discussions about its impact to the
proposed method (see experiments).
4 Experiments
In this section, we give the experiments from three aspects.
4.1 Datasets and Metrics
Datasets: We choose the widely used dataset in action recog-
nition: UCF101 dataset [Soomro et al., 2012]. It con-
tains 13,320 videos with 101 action classes covering a broad
set of activities such as sports, musical instruments, body-
motion, human-human interaction, human-object interaction.
The dataset splits more than 8000 videos in the training set,
and more than 3000 videos in the testing set.
Because there are no other existing methods for video ad-
versarial samples, we can only compare with the methods
based on images, i.e., computing perturbations for each frame
[Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016b] in a video. This setting is
coincident with the outputs using Eq.(1) with l2 norm, which
are reported as the comparisons.
Metrics: We use three metrics to evaluate various aspects.
Fooling ratio (F): is defined as the percentage of ad-
versarial videos that are successfully misclassified [Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016a].
Perceptibility (P): denotes the perceptibility score of
the adversarial perturbation r. We here use the Mean Ab-
solute Perturbation (MAP): P = 1N
∑
i |ri|, where N is the
number of pixels, and ri is the intensity vector (3-dimensional
in the RGB color space).
Sparsity (S): denotes the proportion of frames with no
perturbations (clean frames) versus all the frames in a specific
video to fool DNNs. S = KT , whereK is the number of clean
frames, and T is the total number of frames in a video.
4.2 Perturbation Propagation
In this section, we give the experimental results about the per-
turbation propagation.
Visualization for Perturbations
We firstly give the visualization of perturbations computed
using Eq.(2) with l2,1 norm, which are universal perturba-
tions across videos. In Fig. 3, we see that the adversarial
videos are not distorted by the perturbations, and are imper-
ceptible to human eyes. Furthermore, the perturbations show
the sparse property (black means no perturbations), i.e., they
are reduced across frames along with the time, which is owing
to the used l2,1 norm. In the next section, we will discuss the
propagation of perturbations, inspired by these sparse results.
Perturbation Propagation
To show the perturbation propagation, we give four examples
outputted by Eq.(1) with l2,1 norm in Fig. 4 (see the blue line
with stars), where we see the computed perturbations suc-
cessfully fool the action recognition networks (for example,
in the first case, a clean video with label of Bench Press is
identified as Lunges after adding perturbations). Correspond-
ingly, the original frame-level labels (red dotted line) are also
misclassified as wrong labels (black dotted line). By contrast,
the Mean Absolute Perturbation (MAP) value of each frame
is reduced significantly along with the time. In the last few
frames, they fall into almost zeros. That’s to say, although
few perturbations are added on these frames, the perturba-
tions from the previous frames propagate here, and help fool
the DNNs. As a comparison, we also list the results of Eq.(1)
with l2 norm in Fig. 4 (see the magenta line with circles).
In this figure, the MAP value is also reduced across frames,
which further demonstrates the perturbation propagation. The
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Figure 4: Four examples for showing perturbation propagation on UCF101 dataset. The x-axis denotes the frame indices in a video. The left
y-axis denotes the Mean Absolute Perturbation (MAP) value of each frame’s perturbations, and the right y-axis is the label indices. The blue
line with stars is the curve of MAP values with l2,1 norm, and magenta line with circles is the result with l2 norm. The red dotted line is
the predicted frame-level label indices for the clean video, and black dotted line is the predicted frame-level label indices for the adversarial
video, both by the action recognition networks (the video-level labels are listed in the top of each figure with the same color). In the bottom
of each figure, we give the corresponding video frames. For detailed discussions, please see the texts.
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Figure 5: Four examples of showing perturbation propagation on UCF101 dataset. The difference with Fig. 4 lies in the integration of
temporal mask proposed in Eq.(3). For detailed discussions, please see the texts.
difference is, the output of l2,1 norm is sparse, wh ch reveals
that the frames ranking behind the video line actually need
f w (even no) perturbations to fool DNNs with the help of
propagation. But l2 norm cannot show this p operty.
Inspired by the sparsity of l2,1 norm, we directly enforce
perturbations not to be added on the frames ranking behind
the video line. To this end, we add the temporal mask dur-
ing the optimization process using Eq.3. Here we only se-
lect the top 8 frames to compute their perturbations, and let
the other frames be clean. The experimental results on the
same videos are listed in Fig. 5. We find that the frames are
still predicted as wrong labels. Furthermore, the MAP val-
ues of these frames also show a decreasing trend. It is further
demonstrated the propagation of perturbations. Otherwise,
these clean frames cannot be predicted as wrong labels. Note
that in the forth case in Fig. 5, the final 4 frames have correct
labels, which shows perturbations will reduce its effect along
with the time, and cannot propagate forever.
Table 1: The results of fooling rates versus different sparsities.
S 0%(40) 80%(8) 90%(4) 97.5%(1)
F 100% 100% 91.8% 59.7%
P 0.0698 0.6145 1.0504 1.9319
We now gradually enlarge the sparsity S in Eq.(3), and
observe the change of Fooling ratio F in the testing set on
UCF101 dataset. High sparsity S means more clean frames,
and less adversarial frames in the video. We give the quan-
Figure 6: Four examples of the polluted top one frame in S =
97.5%. The top row is the original clean frames, and the bottom
row is the adversarial frames.
titative results of fooling rates versus different sparsities in
Table. 1. In the table, we list four sparsities (S) and their cor-
responding Fooling rates (F ) as well as perceptibility scores
(P ). Taking 90%(4) as an example, 90% = 1 − 440 , where
4 is top four polluted frames, and 40 is the total number of
frames in the video. The results in Table 1 show that even
only one frame is polluted (S = 97.5%), the Fooling rate
can also reach 59.7%. To achieve the 100% fooling rate, the
least number of polluted frames is 8 (S = 80%) on the used
dataset. We also see that the perceptibility score is gradu-
ally increasing with the rise of sparsity score, and reach the
top in S = 97.5%. This is reasonable because large per-
turbations can spread to more frames. The polluted top one
frames in S = 97.5% and their corresponding clean frames
are illustrated in Fig. 6, where we see that despite the largest
P = 1.9319, the adversarial frames are the same to the clean
frames, which are not perceptible to human eyes.
Adversarial Video based on Propagation
Thanks to the perturbation propagation, we don’t need to
compute perturbations based on the whole video. Instead,
we can compute perturbations on a shorten version video,
and then adapt them to the long version video. In this way,
the computation cost is reduced significantly. We report the
time of computing perturbations for various frames in Table
2, where we see the computing time is linearly reduced with
the rise of sparsity, showing that computing perturbations on
a shorten version video can reduce computation cost.
Specifically, to fool the action recognition network for a
given video, we first choose the top N frames {F1, ..., FN}
from the original video , and then use Eq.(1) (for a single
video) or Eq.(2) (for getting universal perturbations) with l2
norm to compute their adversarial frames {Fˆ1, ..., FˆN}. Fi-
nally, we replace {F1, ..., FN} with {Fˆ1, ..., FˆN} in the orig-
inal video. This modified video is then input to the action
recognition networks. Note that, we here don’t use the l2,1
norm. Because the l2,1 norm will result in the sparse pertur-
bations during theseN frames, which are not good for further
propagation to the rest clean frames. We plot the comparisons
between l2 and l2,1 norm in this setting in Fig. 7. In this fig-
ure, we see the performance of l2 norm is advantageous to
l2,1 norm. In the next section, we will give the detailed eval-
uations and discussions of this method. In default, we set
N = 20 and use l2 norm in the following experiments.
Table 2: Time for computing perturbations in one iteration.
S 0% 50% 75% 87.5% 97.5%
Time 2.853s 1.367s 0.612s 0.346s 0.0947s
4.3 Performance and Transferability
In this section, we evaluate the performance and transferabil-
ity of the propagation based method.
Transferability across Models
We firstly evaluate the transferability of computed perturba-
tions. Because the transferability of CNN networks has been
studied in many literatures, we here mainly explore the RNN
networks, including Vanilla RNN, LSTM, and GRU. Besides,
the results of CNN + Average Pooling (removing the RNN
layer in Fig. 2) are also reported. The Fooling rates in differ-
ent settings are given in Table 3, where we use the networks
in rows to generate perturbations, and networks in columns
evaluate the transferability. Form the table, we draw the fol-
lowing conclusions: 1. The diagonals have largest values.
It is reasonable because they perform the white-box attack
in this setting. 2. In the off-diagonals, the values are all
above 65%, which shows perturbations in videos have good
transferability, especially in the RNN models. 3. In the off-
diagonals, the Pooling column has the poor performance.
Pooling method has no memory like LSTM or GRU, and
thus, the perturbations cannot propagate to other frames, re-
sulting in the poor performance. 4. By contrast, theGRU and
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Figure 7: Comparisons between l2 and l2,1 norm versus Fooling
rate on UCF101 dataset. We here report the results when N =
1, 5, 10, 20, 40, respectively. The total number of frames is 40.
LSTM columns have better performance than VanillaRNN.
As we known, GRU and LSTM can represent long memory,
this demonstrates long memory is favor to the propagation
of perturbations, and thus GRU and LSTM are easier to be
attacked than VanillaRNN.
Table 3: Fooling rates in different settings on UCF101 dataset.
Models VanillaRNN LSTM GRU Pooling
VanillaRNN 95.2% 95.2% 95.2% 71.0%
LSTM 84.1% 100% 97.1% 76.8%
GRU 81.8% 92.4% 100% 66.7%
Pooling 84.1% 96.8% 95.2% 87.3%
Transferability across Videos
We also evaluate the transferability of perturbations across
videos. Th universal perturbations are computed using Eq.(2)
on training set, and then are added to the testing videos to
evaluate their transferability. The visualization of universal
perturbations can be found in Fig. 3. The performance (Fool-
ing rate) is listed in Table 4, where shows the results of our
method has good transferability across videos (achieving the
95.2% fooling rate on the testing set). In other words, the
universal perturbations can make new videos fool the action
recognition networks.
Table 4: Performance of the cross-videos attack.
Metric Training set Testing set
Fooling rate (F) 100% 95.2%
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we explored the adversarial perturbations for
videos. An l2,1-norm based optimization algorithm was pro-
posed to solve this problem. The l2,1 norm applied the l1
norm across frames, and thus, can ensure the sparsity of
perturbations. A serial of experiments conducted on UCF101
dataset demonstrated that our method had better transferabil-
ity across models and videos. More importantly, our method
showed the propagation of perturbations under the l2,1 con-
straint within the CNN+RNN architecture. According to this
observation, we further presented the efficient method for ad-
versarial videos based on the perturbation propagation.
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